An Active Directory (AD) risk assessment is not a generic “security audit.” Done well, it’s a structured attempt to answer one question: “How can an attacker or insider turn today’s identity design into tomorrow’s outage or breach?”
This guide gives you a complete, defensible scope—what to inventory, what evidence to collect, what to test, and what deliverables to produce—so your assessment results are actionable (not a pile of screenshots).
1) Define the objective (what “risk” means in AD)
AD risk is not “number of misconfigurations.” AD risk is the probability that identity control is lost (or abused) and the blast radius that follows.
Use an AD-specific risk model
- Crown jewels: domain admins, DCs, PKI/AD CS, identity sync, privileged groups, Tier-0 assets, high-value servers/apps.
- Paths: which permissions, trusts, delegations, or policies let a low-priv user become high-priv?
- Outcomes: ransomware enablement, credential theft, stealth persistence, mass account takeover, business outage.
Write the “assessment promise” in one sentence
Example: “We will identify and prioritize the top ways a compromised user/computer could become Tier-0 or cause widespread impact, and provide a sequenced remediation plan that reduces those paths within 30/60/90 days.”
2) Scope & boundaries (what’s in, what’s out)
Scoping is where assessments succeed or fail. AD is an ecosystem: AD DS, DNS, GPOs, certificate services, identity sync, endpoints, and cloud identity all influence the outcome.
Define the identity control plane
- Directory: forest(s), domains, OUs, sites/subnets, trusts, RODCs, functional levels.
- Authentication: Kerberos/NTLM posture, LDAP signing/channel binding, legacy protocols.
- Authorization: group design, ACLs, delegation, GPO rights, AdminSDHolder, privileged access model.
- Operational dependencies: DNS, time sync, replication health, backup/restore readiness.
- Hybrid identity: Entra ID integration, sync tooling, conditional access implications (if applicable).
Be explicit about exclusions
Exclusions are fine, but write them down: “application code review not included,” “endpoint EDR tuning not included,” “penetration testing not included,” etc. Then note what signals you will still use (for example, AD logs that indicate endpoint compromise patterns).
3) Evidence to collect (minimum viable dataset)
A risk assessment should be reproducible. That means your findings must be tied to evidence you can re-check later. Aim to collect evidence in four buckets:
A) Topology & health
- Forest/domain inventory (DC count, OS versions, sites, replication topology).
- DNS and time sync dependencies.
- Replication and SYSVOL health indicators.
- Backup posture (system state), and proof of restore testing.
B) Identity & privilege structure
- Privileged group membership (Tier-0 groups and any delegated admin groups).
- Service accounts (human-owned vs managed, SPNs, privilege level, interactive logon allowances).
- Delegation settings (constrained/unconstrained/resource-based, where used, by whom, why).
- Trusts (external/forest, SID filtering posture, selective authentication usage).
C) Authorization controls (where “shadow admin” risk lives)
- ACLs on OUs, GPOs, and high-value objects.
- Inherited permissions vs explicit grants.
- Ownership anomalies (who can change permissions, who can reset passwords, who can link GPOs).
D) Telemetry & detectability
- Advanced audit policy coverage and consistency.
- Central log collection (WEF/SIEM/Defender for Identity), retention, and alerting maturity.
- Baseline of “normal” privileged activity (frequency, origin hosts, service patterns).
Tip: For ongoing governance, you want evidence that can be refreshed automatically. Treat the assessment like the first iteration of a continuous control program.
4) Assessment areas (what to test and why)
4.1 Privileged access model (Tier-0 protection)
Most AD “catastrophes” are identity catastrophes. Your assessment should prove whether Tier-0 is actually protected: where admin credentials exist, where they’re used, and what can steal them.
- Identify all Tier-0 groups and verify membership hygiene (direct + nested membership).
- Verify admin separation (admin accounts separate from daily user accounts).
- Check privileged access workflow: approvals, break-glass, and emergency procedures.
- Validate that admin activity originates from hardened admin workstations or secure jump points.
Related reading (internal): Auditing Nested Group Memberships: An Expert Guide
4.2 Permissions & delegation (the “hidden admin” layer)
Group membership is only the visible layer. Real power often lives in ACLs, delegated rights, and “who can change what.” Your assessment should map administrative capability, not just titles.
- Find who can reset passwords, write to sensitive attributes, modify group membership, or change ACLs.
- Review OU delegation for scope creep (broad rights given “temporarily” that became permanent).
- Check ownership of high-value objects (ownership often equals control).
- Review AdminSDHolder impact and protected group behavior.
Related reading (internal): Active Directory Permissions Explained
4.3 Group Policy risk (policy as an attack surface)
GPOs can deploy settings, scripts, scheduled tasks, software, and security configuration at scale—making them a prime persistence and mass-impact mechanism. Your assessment should treat GPO control as “code execution potential.”
- Who can create, edit, or link GPOs in production OUs?
- Are there “high-impact” GPOs (logon scripts, local admin management, software deployment) with weak delegation?
- Is SYSVOL protected appropriately and monitored?
- Are there change controls (documented owners, review cadence, and rollback ability)?
Related reading (internal): GPO Delegation in AD
4.4 Authentication posture (reduce credential theft and replay)
Your assessment should validate whether the environment still allows legacy and risky authentication behaviors that attackers love.
- NTLM usage hotspots and whether reduction plans exist.
- LDAP signing / channel binding posture (where applicable).
- Kerberos hygiene: service principal usage, service account practices, and suspicious patterns.
- Local admin sprawl and credential exposure paths (where admins log on matters).
4.5 DC and directory operations (availability is security)
AD outages often become security incidents (and vice versa). A risk assessment should verify operational resilience: can you patch, recover, and restore without improvisation?
- DC patching cadence, unsupported OS, and decommission hygiene.
- Replication health and monitoring coverage.
- Backup and restore readiness (documented, tested, and time-bounded RTO/RPO expectations).
- Baseline maintenance items (stale objects, tombstone risks, and drift control).
Related reading (internal): Active Directory Maintenance Checklist
4.6 Logging, detection, and response readiness
A critical output of the assessment is “detectability.” If a high-impact path exists, can you see it in time? The goal is not “turn on all logs,” but “turn on the right logs, centralized, searchable, and alertable.”
- Advanced audit policies aligned to identity abuse scenarios (privileged group changes, directory replication events, GPO changes).
- Centralized collection (WEF/SIEM/Defender) with retention that matches investigation needs.
- Alert rules for “rare but high signal” events (privileged membership changes, policy tampering, suspicious authentication spikes).
- Runbooks for the top identity incidents (lockouts at scale, suspected credential theft, suspicious admin activity).
Related reading (internal): Event collection with Microsoft Defender for Identity
5) How to score and prioritize findings
Your stakeholders don’t need 200 “mediums.” They need a prioritized plan. Use a scoring approach that matches identity reality: impact × likelihood × exposure × detectability.
A practical scoring rubric
- Impact: Can this lead to Tier-0 compromise, mass account takeover, or outage?
- Likelihood: How feasible is it with realistic attacker capability?
- Exposure: How many users/systems can reach the vulnerable condition?
- Detectability: Would you know quickly, or only after damage?
Turn findings into a “path reduction” plan
In AD, you often get the biggest risk reduction by removing the shortest, easiest paths to Tier-0: cleaning privileged group structure, tightening delegation, hardening GPO rights, and improving detection on the few events that matter most.
Include a remediation sequence, not just recommendations
A strong assessment answers: “What do we fix first, second, and third to reduce risk fast while minimizing operational disruption?”
| Priority | Fix theme | Why it’s early | Typical time-to-value |
|---|---|---|---|
| P0 | Tier-0 containment | Stops full-domain compromise paths | Days–2 weeks |
| P1 | Delegation & ACL cleanup | Removes “shadow admin” control | 2–6 weeks |
| P2 | GPO control hardening | Reduces mass-impact persistence | 2–6 weeks |
| P3 | Telemetry + alerting upgrades | Improves time-to-detect, time-to-respond | 1–8 weeks |
| P4 | Resilience (backup/restore) | Prevents incidents from becoming disasters | 2–12 weeks |
6) Deliverables your stakeholders will actually use
Deliverable 1: Executive summary (1–2 pages)
- Top 5 risks (plain English) and their business impact.
- Current risk posture (high-level score or maturity band).
- 30/60/90-day remediation plan (themes, not technical minutiae).
Deliverable 2: Technical findings report
- Finding statement, affected scope, evidence, and proof.
- Attack story: “If X happens, attacker can do Y because Z.”
- Remediation steps (immediate containment + long-term fix).
- Validation method: how you’ll confirm the fix worked.
Deliverable 3: Risk register (sortable)
- Risk title, category, score, owner, target date, dependencies.
- Current state vs target state.
- Status tracking (Open / In progress / Mitigated / Accepted).
Deliverable 4: Evidence pack
Screenshots are not evidence by themselves. Evidence is the minimal data needed to re-check: exports, queries, configuration snapshots, and a clear trail that ties each finding to what was observed.
7) Active Directory risk assessment checklist
Scope & inventory
- Forest/domain topology documented (DCs, sites, trusts, functional levels).
- Tier-0 assets identified (DCs, PKI, identity sync, privileged groups).
- Assessment exclusions documented (and why).
Privilege and access control
- Privileged groups reviewed (direct + nested membership).
- Service accounts inventoried and categorized (risk by privilege and exposure).
- Delegation reviewed (OU rights, object ACLs, ownership anomalies).
- Admin workflows reviewed (separation of accounts, break-glass, approval flow).
Policy and configuration
- GPO control reviewed (who can create/edit/link; high-impact policies identified).
- Legacy authentication risks identified (NTLM hotspots, LDAP posture where applicable).
- Baseline drift identified (where config deviates from your standard).
Telemetry and response
- Advanced audit policies verified for consistency and coverage.
- Central log collection and retention verified.
- High-signal alert candidates identified (privileged changes, policy tampering, unusual auth patterns).
- Top identity incident runbooks reviewed (who does what, how fast, with what evidence).
Resilience
- Backup and restore readiness validated (including testing evidence).
- Replication and SYSVOL health monitoring validated.
- Decommission and lifecycle hygiene validated (stale objects, retired DC artifacts).
FAQ
How often should we run an AD risk assessment?
At minimum annually, plus after major changes (new domain/forest, new trust, M&A integration, identity platform changes, or a security incident). Many teams do a “full” assessment annually and a lighter quarterly review of Tier-0, delegation, and logging.
Is a vulnerability scan enough?
No. Vulnerability scans find patch/config issues, but AD compromise often comes from relationships: group nesting, delegation, trusts, and permissions that create escalation paths even in fully patched environments.
What’s the most common reason assessments don’t lead to improvements?
Findings aren’t tied to owners, timelines, and validation steps. The fix is to ship a remediation sequence (30/60/90 days) with measurable outcomes, not just a list of issues.
